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I. 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDING 
Jurisdiction. The Utah Supreme Court had original, 
non-exclusive jurisdiction in this matter pursuant to Utah Code 
Ann. § 78-2-2(3)(i) (Supp. 1988) inasmuch as the Order and 
Judgment which are the subjects of this appeal (Record on Appeal 
(MR.M) at 105-6; 233-34), copies of which are attached hereto as 
Addenda MA" and "B," respectively/ are final orders of the Second 
Judicial District Court of Weber County, over which the Utah 
Court of Appeals did not have original appellate jurisdiction. 
Pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(4)(g) (Supp. 1988), however, 
the Utah Supreme Court transferred this matter to the Utah Court 
of Appeals on June 15, 1988. (R. 380.) 
Nature of Proceeding. This is an appeal by appellants David 
Durbano, Paul Sachter and Richard Mortensen from an Order and a 
Judgment of the Second Judicial District Court of Weber County. 
The Order was entered by the Honorable David E. Roth and denied 
the appellants Motion to Dismiss brought pursuant to Rule 12(b) 
of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. (R. 105-6; Addendum 
ffA.lf) The Judgment was entered by the Honorable Ronald O. Hyde 
in favor of respondents in response to their Motion for Summary 
Judgment brought pursuant to Rule 56, Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure. (R. 233-34; Addendum "B.") 
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II. 
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
A. Whether The District Court Properly Denied 
Appellants1 Motion To Dismiss By Ruling That 
Utah Code Ann. § 57-1-32 (1953) Was Inapplica-
ble To Junior Lienholders Seeking A Money 
Judgment After A Foreclosure Sale By A Senior 
Lienholder. 
B. Whether The District Court Properly Granted 
Respondents1 Motion For Summary Judgment By 
Ruling That There Were No Genuine Issues Of 
Material Fact And That Respondents Were 
Entitled To Judgment As A Matter Of Law. 
III. 
RELEVANT TEXT OF APPLICABLE STATUTES 
Utah Code Ann. § 57-1-32 (1953). 
Sale of Trust Property By Trustee; Action To Recover 
Balance Due Upon Obligation For Which Trust Deed Was 
Given As Security; Collection of Costs and Attorney's 
Fees. 
At any time within three months after any 
sale of property under a trust deedf as 
hereinabove provided, an action may be 
commenced to recover the balance due upon the 
obligation for which the trust deed was given 
as security, and in such action the complaint 
shall set forth the entire amount of the 
indebtedness which was secured by such trust 
deed, the amount for which such property was 
sold, and the fair market value thereof at the 
date of sale. Before rendering judgment, the 
court shall find the fair market value at the 
date of sale of the property sold. The court 
may not render judgment for more than the 
amount by which the amount of the indebtedness 
with interest, costs, and expenses of sale, 
including trustee's and attorney's fees, 
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exceeds the fair market value of the property 
as of the date of the sale. In any action 
brought under this sectionf the prevailing 
party shall be entitled to collect its costs 
and reasonable attorney fees incurred in 
bringing an action under this section, 
Utah Code Ann. § 70A-3-606 (1953). 
Impairment of recourse or of collateral. 
(1) The holder discharges any party to 
the instrument to the extent that without such 
party's consent the holder 
(a) without express reservation of 
rights releases or agrees not to sue any 
person against whom the party has to the 
knowledge of the holder a right of recourse or 
agrees to suspend the right to enforce against 
such person the instrument or collateral or 
otherwise discharges such person/ except that 
failure or delay in effecting any required 
presentment, protest or notice of dishonor 
with respect to any such person does not 
discharge any party as to whom presentment, 
protest or notice of dishonor is effective or 
unnecessary; or 
(b) unjustifiably impairs any 
collateral for the instrument given by or on 
behalf of the party or any person against whom 
he has a right of recourse. 
(2) By express reservation rights 
against a party with a right of recourse the 
holder preserves 
(a) all his rights against such 
party as of the time when the instrument was 
originally due; and 
(b) the right of the party to pay 
the instrument as of that time; and 
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(c) all rights of such party to 
recourse against others. 
IV. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case. This action was commenced by the 
plaintiffs/respondents to recover on a promissory note executed 
by the defendants/appellants, as well as by defendants Steven R. 
Cundick and Marlene H. Cundick, who are not parties to this 
appeal. (R. 1-8.) 
Course of Proceeding and Disposition in the Court Below. 
Defendants/appellants moved to dismiss the Complaint 
pursuant to Rule 12(b), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, on the 
grounds that plaintiffs/respondents had not commenced their 
action within the three-month period set forth in Utah Code Ann. 
§ 57-1-32 (1953). (R. 24-26.) After considering the memoranda 
and argument of counsel, the district court, the Honorable 
David E. Roth presiding, denied the motion of 
defendants/appellants, ruling that the statute was inapplicable 
to the facts of this case. (R. 105-6; Addendum flA.M) 
Thereafter, and again after considering memoranda, argument, and 
1
 Defendants/respondents did not designate a transcript of 
the hearing on the Motion as part of the record on appeal, nor 
did they order that a transcript be prepared. 
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affidavits submitted by the parties, the district court, the 
Honorable Ronald 0. Hyde presiding, granted the Motion for 
Summary Judgment of plaintiffs/respondents on the grounds that 
there were no genuine issues of material fact and that 
respondents were entitled to judgment as a matter of law. 
(R. 233-34; Addendum "B.") 
Statement of the Facts. Prior to December of 1979, 
plaintiffs/respondents G. Adams Limited Partnership ("Adams") and 
C. A. Ferrin, Jr. ("Ferrin"), owned a parcel of property located 
in Ogden, Utah, which was divided into three pieces (the 
"Property"). (R. 139.) On December 14, 1979, defendants 
/appellants David L. Durbano, Paul Sachter and Richard Mortensen 
("Durbano, Sachter and Mortensen") entered into a contract to 
purchase the Property from Adams and Ferrin for the price of 
$165,000.00, $20,000.00 of which was paid as a down payment, with 
the balance to be paid under the terms of a Uniform Real Estate 
Contract. (R. 140; 142.) 
Certain payments were made under the Uniform Real Estate 
Contract. (R. 140 at 11 4.) Beginning in January of 1983, 
however, Durbano, Sachter and Mortensen were in default. (R. 14 
at 1[ 4.) They remained in default under the contract until May 
of 1984 when they reached an agreement with Adams and Ferrin, 
pursuant to which Adams and Ferrin allowed the Property to be 
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sold to defendants Steven R. Cundick and Marlene H. Cundick (the 
"Cundick sale"). (R. 140 at 11 4.) Pursuant to the agreementf 
Adams and Ferrin were to receive the proceeds from the Cundick 
sale, which, when and if fully paid, would satisfy the amount of 
the obligation which remained owing by Durbano, Sachter and 
Mortensen under the Uniform Real Estate Contract. (R. 140 at 
11 4.) 
In connection with the Cundick sale, Adams and Ferrin 
demanded that Sachter, Mortensen and Durbano, as well as the 
Cundicks, execute a promissory note secured by a trust deed 
covering the Property. (R. 140 at 11 5; R. 47; R. 49; a true and 
accurate copy of the promissory note is attached hereto as 
Addendum f,C.M) The amount of the promissory note was the amount 
which remained owing by Durbano, Sachter and Mortensen under the 
original Uniform Real Estate Contract, less the cash down payment 
received by Adams and Ferrin from the Cundick sale. (R. 140 at 
1IK 4 and 5.) 
In order to finance the cash down payment made to Adams and 
Ferrin in connection with the Cundick sale, the Cundicks borrowed 
a sum from Citizens Bank. (R. 141 at 11 5.) To reiterate, that 
sum was applied to reduce the existing obligation of Durbano, 
Sachter and Mortensen under the Uniform Real Estate Contract. 
(R. 141 at 11 5.) In agreeing to finance the cash down payment, 
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howeverf Citizens Bank required that it receive a trust deed in a 
first position on the Property; Adams and Ferrin, desiring to 
facilitate the sale, agreed to subordinate their trust deed 
covering the Property to that of Citizens Bank. (R. 141 at 
11 5.) Therefore, the trust deed given to Citizens Bank, which 
was executed contemporaneously with the trust deed given to Adams 
and Ferrin, (see R. 50 (Adams and Ferrin Trust Deed); R. 202; 
(Citizens Bank Trust Deed)), was recorded in a first position, 
and the trust deed of Adams and Ferrin was recorded in a second 
position. 
Subsequently, the Cundicks defaulted on their payment 
obligations to Citizens Bank. (R. 141; R. 146.) Citizens Bank, 
thereafter, became insolvent and was taken over by the Federal 
Deposit Insurance Corporation ("F.D.I .C.") . (R. 141 at 11 6.) 
The F.D.I.C. ultimately foreclosed the trust deed that had been 
given to Citizens Bank and a trustee's sale was held on March 7, 
1987, at which time the F.D.I.C. purchased the Property with a 
credit-bid of $40,521.50. (R. 147 at K 4.) As the amount of the 
Cundicks1 obligation to Citizens Bank at the time of their 
default was $37,302.06, plus interest, penalties and fees, 
(R. 148), there were no proceeds from the trustee's sale 
available to pay Adams and Ferrin, and Adams and Ferrin received 
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nothing from the trustee's sale. (R. 147 at 11 5; R. 141 at 11 6; 
R. 48 at K 5.) 
In the meantime, Durbano, Sachter and Mortensen, as well as 
the Cundicks, failed to make any payments under the promissory 
note to Adams or Ferrin. (R. 48 at 11 7.) Significantly, 
however, neither Adams nor Ferrin ever instituted a foreclosure 
action, whether judicial or non-judicial, on their junior trust 
deed. (R. 48 at K 6.) Instead, their security under their note 
having been exhausted by the F.D.I.C.fs trustee's sale, they 
filed suit on August 19, 1987 against Durbano, Sachter, Mortensen 
and the Cundicks, seeking a money judgment under the promissory 
note. (R. 1-4.) 
In response, Durbano, Sachter and Mortensen moved to dismiss 
the Complaint on the grounds that it was filed more than three 
months after the F.D.I.C.'s trustee's sale held on March 7, 1987, 
allegedly in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 57-1-32 (1953). 
(R. 24-26.) Recognizing that it was the F.D.I.C, rather than 
Adams and Ferrin which foreclosed its trust deed and caused the 
trustee's sale to occur, Judge David E. Roth concluded that Utah 
Code Ann. § 57-1-32 was inapplicable and, therefore, denied the 
Motion to Dismiss. (R. 104.) 
Thereafter, Adams and Ferrin moved for summary judgment on 
the grounds that there were no genuine issues of material fact 
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and that they were entitled to judgment as a matter of law. 
(R. 80.) The motion was supported by memoranda (R. 53-57; 
R. 128-37), and the affidavits of C. A. Ferrinf Jr. (R. 47-48; 
149-50), Glenn Adams (R. 139-144), and Alfred J. Newman 
(R. 146-48). Durbano, Sachter and Mortensen responded with their 
own memorandum and affidavits in which they argued that (1) they 
signed the note as guarantors rather than as principal obligors 
(R. 115), and (2) they did not receive anything of "value" in 
return for signing the note (R. 115). (See Affidavits of 
Durbano, Sachter and Mortensen dated 12/23/87 at R. 118-20; 
121-23; 124-126, respectively.)2 
At the hearing on the Motion for Summary Judgment, Judge 
Ronald Hyde granted Durbano, Sachter and Mortensen ten-days to 
file additional documents which, at the hearing, their attorney 
z
 Subsequent to the filing of this appeal, respondents 
discovered that the affidavit of David Durbano (R. 118-20) may 
have been filed with a forged signature. That possibility is 
clearly illustrated by a comparison between Durbano1s signature 
on the affidavit, with Durbano*s signature on other documents in 
the record, such as the promissory note (R. 76; Addendum "C"), 
and, most graphically, another affidavit which was ultimately 
filed by appellants (R. 172-79), which affidavit was subsequently 
stricken by the district court. (See Ruling on Plaintiffs' 
Motion to Strike Affidavits, R. 341-42; Addendum "D" hereto.) 
Respondents moved the district court for leave, pursuant to Rule 
27(b), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, to take depositions during 
the pendency of this appeal regarding the possible forgery. The 
motion was granted and depositions were scheduled to occur at the 
time this Brief was prepared. 
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contended would support their position in opposition to the 
motion, but which documents were allegedly unavailable at the 
time of the hearing. (R. 211.) After the ten-day period 
expired, appellants' attorney contacted Judge Hyde, ex parte, and 
obtained an extension of time in which to file the documents. 
(R. 217-18; R. 341-42.) Thereafter, appellants' attorney filed 
additional affidavits with the Court (R. 172-79), as well as 
numerous documents (R. 170-71; 184-205), all but a few of which 
had been previously furnished by respondents1 counsel to 
appellants' counsel almost eight months before the summary 
judgment hearing. (R. 217-20.) Adams and Ferrin promptly filed 
a Motion to Strike the newly filed affidavits on the grounds they 
were filed untimely and without leave of court, and on the 
grounds they were replete with hearsay and conclusory 
statements. (R. 222-23; R. 229-31.) Contrary to appellants' 
curious statement that "no Order has been signed" in regard to 
the Motion to Strike (Appellants' Brief at p. 11), Judge Hyde 
himself wrote a strongly worded ruling striking the affidavits on 
the grounds that they were filed without leave of court, raised 
new argument, and contained conclusory statements. (R. 341-42; a 
copy of the Ruling on Plaintiffs' Motion to Strike Affidavits is 
attached hereto as Addendum "D".) Thereafter, Judge Hyde granted 
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the Motion for Summary Judgment in favor of Adams and Ferrin and 
against all defendants. (R. 233-34; Addendum ffB.") 
V. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
A. Utah Code Ann. § 57-1-32 (1953) Is Inapplica-
ble To Junior Lienholders Seeking A Money 
Judgment After A Foreclosure Sale By A Senior 
Lienholder. 
Appellants contend that the district court erred in denying 
their Motion to Dismiss respondents1 Complaint pursuant to Utah 
Code Ann. § 57-1-32 (1953). Appellants' argument is completely 
without merit. Appellants have failed to note that respondents1 
action is not an action for a deficiency governed by Utah Code 
Ann. § 57-1-32 (1953); ratherf it is a suit on an unsecured 
promissory note to which that statute has no application. 
Assuming for argument that the respondents1 action can be 
properly characterized as an action for a deficiency/ courts have 
nonetheless consistently held that statutes/ like Utah Code Ann. 
§ 57-1-32 (1953)f have no application to junior lienholders like 
respondents who have never exercised their power of sale and 
whose note becomes unsecured as a result of a foreclosure by a 
senior lienholder. The rational behind those decisions is 
compelling from a policy standpoint because (1) it protects the 
rights of sold out junior lienholders who may be unaware their 
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security has been lost through foreclosure of a senior lien, and 
(2) it protects debtors against the unexpected acceleration of 
notes that are not in default and have not yet matured. Thusf 
the district court properly denied appellant's Motion to Dismiss. 
B. The District Court Properly Granted 
Respondents' Motion For Summary Judgment In 
That There Were No Genuine Issues Of Material 
Fact And Respondents Were Entitled To Judgment 
As A Matter Of Law. 
In contending that the district court erred in granting 
respondents' Motion for Summary Judgmentf appellants make the 
following arguments: First, they contend that they were not 
principally obligated under the notef but rather signed the note 
merely as "guarantors" or "accommodation makers." (Appellants1 
Brief at pp. 38-42.) As such, appellants contend that their 
obligations under the note should be discharged because 
respondents unjustifiably impaired the collateral under the note 
by subordinating their trust deed to that of Citizens Bank. 
(Id.) Second, appellants contend that there were several 
"material issues" of fact created by the affidavits submitted by 
them which preclude the entry of summary judgment. (_Id. at pp. 
43-48.) 
Both of the appellants' arguments, however, are completely 
without merit. In regard to the impairment of collateral 
argument, appellants presented not a shred of evidence, other 
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than their own self-serving and conclusory affidavits, which 
support the notion they signed the note as "guarantors" or 
"accommodation makers." Indeed, appellants cannot be 
accommodation makers of the subject promissory note because the 
note represented the antecedent debt of the appellants 
themselves. Nonetheless, even if they enjoyed the status of 
accommodation makers, they expressly waived their impairment of 
collateral defense by consenting "to the release of any security, 
or any part thereof, with or without substitution" under the 
terms of the note. (R. 49; Addendum "C") Further, even if they 
were guarantors and did not waive their impairment of collateral 
defense, appellants presented no evidence that they did not know 
about or consent to respondents' subordination of the trust 
deed. Thus, there is no support for appellants1 contention that 
they should somehow be discharged from their obligations because 
of the subordination. 
Additionally, appellants1 suggestion that issues of genuine 
material fact existed before the district court which precluded 
the entry of summary judgment is simply not born out by the 
record. Appellants suggest that they did not receive value for 
the note (Appellants' Brief, p. 38), that the amount owing under 
the note was disputed (^ d. at p. 43), and that there were 
questions concerning both the value of the Property and the 
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"intentions" of the parties (^ d. at 43; 46-48). At best, 
howeverf appellants' suggestions constitute wishful thinking. At 
worst, they are a blatant misrepresentation of the record. In 
either event, as shown below, appellants' arguments in this 
regard cannot be supported. 
VI. 
ARGUMENT 
A. Utah Code Ann. § 57-1-32 (1953) Is Inapplica-
ble To Junior Lienholders Seeking A Money 
Judgment After A Foreclosure Sale By A Senior 
Lienholder. 
1. Respondents' Complaint Is Based Solely On An Unsecured 
Note and Is Not An Action For A Deficiency. Appellants contend 
that the district court erred in failing to dismiss respondents1 
Complaint because it was not filed within the three-month time 
limit required by Utah Code Ann. 57-1-32 (1953). In making their 
argument, appellants have gone to extraordinary lengths 
attempting to corral the facts of this case into the legal 
confines of that statute. That attempt, however, must fail; most 
obviously because appellants have ignored entirely the nature of 
respondents' action. Put simply, respondents1 Complaint is not 
an action for a deficiency governed by Utah Code Ann. § 57-1-32 
(1953); rather, it is a suit on an unsecured promissory note to 
which the aforementioned statute has no application. 
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It has long been recognized that a promissory note and a 
deed of trust given to secure the payment of that promissory note 
are separate and independent obligations. See, e.g., Gebrueder 
Heidemann, K.G. v. A.R.M. Corp., 688 P.2d 1180, 1187 (Idaho 
1984); 2 Glen on Mortgages § 140 (1943). Based upon the separate 
and independent nature of each obligation, courts in Utah and 
other states have uniformly held that when a junior lienholder1s 
deed of trust becomes valueless, whether by an act of the debtor 
or a foreclosure of the debtor's interest by a senior lienholder, 
the junior lienholder may bring an action against the maker of 
the note based solely upon the obligations created by the note. 
For example, in Cache Valley Banking Co. v. Logan Lodge No. 1453 
B.P.O.E., 56 P.2d 1046 (Utah 1936), the Utah Supreme Court was 
faced with the issue of determining whether the plaintiff, a 
mortgagee in a junior position, could maintain an action on a 
note after its security had been extinguished through the 
foreclosure by a mortgagee in a senior position. The Supreme 
Court reasoned that "where the security has been lost through no 
fault of the [junior] mortgagee, an action may be maintained 
directly upon the personal obligation evidenced by the note." 
Id. at 1049. (Emphasis Added.) As the Court noted, once the 
security created by the second deed of trust is extinguished, it 
would be fruitless for the junior lienholder to look to that deed 
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of trust as a means of recovering on the obligation. Id. The 
Court further observed: 
It was no fault of the plaintiff 
that the security for its note was 
lost. The fault is rather with defendant 
for failing to pay the first mortgage and 
thus causing it to be foreclosed. The 
plaintiff could not have prevented the 
loss of the security by foreclosing its 
second mortgage. The mortgaged premises 
were not sufficient to satisfy the first 
mortgage. 
. . . Plaintiff has no longer a lien 
upon the propertyf and his debt is not 
now secured by mortgage. He did not 
voluntarily release his security. He has 
not waived nor lost it by his 
negligence. It was lost by the fault of 
the mortgagor in not paying the first 
mortgage. . . . [T]he foreclosure of the 
first mortgage does not 
liability of the maker 
mortgage note and a 
extinguish the 
of the second 
suit may be 
maintained on such a note. 
Id. (citations omitted) (emphasis added). 
Respondents Adams and Ferrin are in precisely the same 
position as the junior lienholder in Cache Valley Banking. The 
security evidenced by their deed of trust was lost, not through 
3Appellants suggest that the Cache Valley Banking case has 
no application to this matter because of the passage of Utah Code 
Ann. § 57-1-32 (1953) subsequent to that decision. However, 
appellants fail to mention that the rationale of the Cache Valley 
Banking case has recently been reiterated in two Utah Supreme 
Court cases decided long after the passage of § 57-1-32 (1953). 
See Lockhart Co. v. Equitable Realty, Inc., 657 P.2d 1333 (Utah 
1983); Utah Mortgage and Loan v. Black, 618 P.2d 43, 45 (Utah 
1980) . 
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any fault of their own, but through the fault of the appellants 
in not paying the senior lienholder. Upon determining that the 
proceeds from the foreclosure of the first lien by the F.D.I.C. 
were insufficient to cover the obligation created by the Notef 
(see R. 47; 140; 147) Adams and Ferrin brought this action 
directly upon the personal obligations evidenced by the Note in 
conformance with the holding of Cache Valley Banking, 
The position of the Utah Supreme Court in Cash Valley 
Banking has been echoed by the courts of numerous other states. 
See, e.g., Hartford National Bank and Trust Co. v. Bowers, 491 
A.2d 431 (Conn. App. Ct. 1985) (plaintiff could sue on a 
promissory note after the court determined that the mortgage 
securing the note was invalid); Gebrueder Heidemann, K.G. v. 
A.R.M. Corp., 688 P.2d 1180, 1187 (Idaho 1984) ("If the mortgage 
given as security is defective or becomes valueless, the 
mortgagee, assuming it prevails on the merits, is still entitled 
to a judgment on the promissory note which is independent of the 
mortgage security."); CD. Blanton v. Sisk, 318 S.E.2d 560, 563 
(N.C. Ct. App. 1984) ("[T]he status of a holder of a second 
purchase money mortgage or deed of trust who does not realize the 
security or any of the proceeds from the foreclosure sale, is 
that of an unsecured creditor."); Keever v. Nicholas Beers Co., 
611 P.2d 1079, 1083 (Nev. 1980) ("The opportunity to sue directly 
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on the obligation afforded to sold out juniors arises from the 
loss of their liens on the security by operation of the 
foreclosure or trustee's sale [by a senior lienholder]."). Olson 
v. Iacometti, 533 P.2d 1360, 1363 (Nev. 1975) ("Foreclosure of 
the first trust deed extinguishes only the security for [that] 
note, not the indebtedness represented by that note."); Sims v. 
Grubb 336 P.2d 759, 761 (Nev. 1959) (" [Foreclosure of the first 
mortgage does not extinguish the liability of the maker of the 
second mortgage note upon loss of the mortgage security through 
the foreclosure of the first mortgage."). 
In their brief, appellants, without discussion, simply 
assume that respondents' Complaint seeks a deficiency. 
Appellants have plainly failed to recognize the distinction so 
clearly set forth in the cases between an action for a 
deficiency4 and an action on a note after the security for the 
note is rendered valueless. That distinction is inherent in the 
above-cited cases authorizing suits on notes by sold out junior 
lienholders, and was discussed in detail in Hillen v. Soule, 45 
4An action for a deficiency judgment is an action for the 
balance due on an obligation secured by a mortgage or deed of 
trust following the exercise of the power of foreclosure in such 
mortgage or deed of trust. See, e.g., Langer v. Aver, 50 Cal. 
Rptr. 847, 849 (Cal. App. 1966); Roseleaf Corp. v. Chierighino, 
378 P.2d 97, 99 (Calif. 1963). See also, Black's Law Dictionary 
379-80 (5th Edition). 
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P.2d 349 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1935)f a case involving facts very 
similar to this case. 
The plaintiff in Hillen held a second deed of trust. After 
his security interest was lost through foreclosure by the holder 
of the first deed of trust, the plaintiff brought an action based 
solely upon his promissory note more than three months after the 
foreclosure by the senior lienholder. The defendant claimed that 
the plaintiff's action was barred by the California statute 
relating to deficiency actions, which was similar to Utah Code 
Ann. § 57-1-32 (1953), in that it required actions for a 
deficiency to be commenced within three months following the 
exercise of the power of sale in a deed of trust. Recognizing 
the inherent distinction between a deficiency action and an 
action on an unsecured note, the Hillen court concluded that the 
three-month limitation period relating to deficiency actions was 
inapplicable to the plaintiff's action. The Hillen court noted: 
It is a sufficient answer to state that this 
is not an action for a deficiency judgment. 
The security was exhausted by the sale under 
the first deed of trust and no sale was had 
under respondent's deed of trust. 
• . . [I]t may be pointed out that power of 
sale under respondent's deed of trust was 
never exercised because the security had been 
exhausted by the sale under the first deed of 
trust. We therefore conclude that the 
limitations referred to by appellant were not 
applicabley . . . 
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Id, at 349. (emphasis added). 
As in Hillen, the respondents' security was "exhausted by 
the sale under the first deed of trust". In addition, 
respondents at no time commenced an action to foreclose their 
deed of trust and have never exercised their power of sale. 
(R 40). Thus, appellants1 conclusory arguments notwithstanding, 
respondents1 Complaint is simply not an action for a deficiency 
judgment, but is rather an action by a creditor on an unsecured 
obligation. 
2. Utah Code Ann. § 57-1-32 (1953) Relates Only To 
Deficiency Actions And Therefore Has No Application To This Case. 
(a) Utah's Statute. Utah Code Ann. § 57-1-32 (1953) 
states as follows: 
At any time within three months after any 
sale of property under a trust deed, as 
hereinabove provided, an action may be 
commenced to recover the balance due upon the 
obligation for which the trust deed was given 
as security, and in such action, the complaint 
shall set forth the entire amount of 
indebtedness which was secured by such trust 
deed, the amount for which such property was 
sold, and the fair market value thereof at the 
date of sale. 
(Emphasis Added). 
On its face, it is clear that the sole purpose of this 
statute is to limit the time in which a beneficiary under a deed 
of trust can bring an action for a deficiency after the 
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foreclosure of his deed of trust fails to satisfy the obligations 
created by his deed of trust. The statute simply does not say, 
as appellants suggest, that any and all junior lienholders whose 
security interest is extinguished through a foreclosure of a 
prior deed of trust, must bring an action within three months of 
the sale of the property. Indeedf the language in the statute 
discusses only one trust deed and only one obligation for which 
the trust deed was given as security — plainly referring to the 
trust deed and obligation being foreclosed. In addition, the 
statute discusses only one recovery, that being the balance which 
remains "due on the obligation for which the trust deed was given 
as security." (Emphasis added). The statutory language thus 
places no express limitation on when junior lienholders may sue 
on notes once their security has been extinguished. Further, 
appellants have not cited a single case interpreting the statute, 
or similar statutes, which even remotely suggests that the 
statute should apply to sold out junior lienholders. 
(b) Moratory Laws in General. 
Utah Code Ann. §57-1-32 (1953) is very similar to statutes 
in many other states, all of which have as their origin 
legislation commonly known as moratory laws. The "one action 
rule," fair value legislation, anti-deficiency statutes and 
deficiency statutes of limitations are the product of the 1930's 
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when depressed land values resulted in foreclosure sales for 
nominal amounts. In discussing how the statutory protections 
afforded by the moratory laws affect junior lienholders, one 
noted author in this area has written: 
[S]uppose . . • the second mortgagee has no 
security, as demonstrated by the results that 
actually attended foreclosure of the first 
lien. Then, he is nothing but a general 
creditor to the full extent of his debt. He 
was always in the shoes of the mortgagor 
anyway, as against the senior mortgage. So 
also are the latterfs general creditor's as is 
demonstrated by the law of creditors1 
rights. If, then, his security is actually 
worthless, the second mortgagee's position is 
no different from that of a general 
cred: 
laws 
Ltor 
do 
general 
govei 
but 
Since 
not opera 
debts, it 
trn the second 
a general 
these deficiency judgment 
tte as a restriction upon 
follows that they 
mortgagee, who is 
creditor unde 
do not 
nothing 
r the 
circumstances. 
2 Glenn on Mortgages § 161 (1943). (Emphasis Added). 
Consistent with this view, courts have generally held that 
none of the moratory laws apply to sold out junior 
lienholders. See, e.g., First Security Bank of Utah, N.A. v. 
Felger, 658 F.Supp. 175, 182 (D. Utah 1987) (the one action rule 
does not apply to sold out junior lienholders); CD. Blankton v. 
* The one judicial exception to this rule, which has no 
application to this case, arises when there is a state statute 
which completely prohibits deficiency judgments after a 
non-judicial foreclosure of a purchase money deed of trust. See, 
Barnaby v. Boardman, 330 S.E.2d 600, 602-03 (N.C. 1985). 
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Sisk, 318 S.E.2d 560f 563 (N.C. Ct. App. 1984) ("[Tjhe status of 
a holder of a second purchase money mortgage or deed of trustf 
who does not realize the security or any of the proceeds from the 
foreclosure sale, is that of an unsecured creditor. As a general 
rule the anti-deficiency statute does not apply to actions by 
unsecured creditors."); Lockhart Co. v. Equitable Realty Co.f 657 
P.2d 1333f 1336 (Utah 1983) (the one-action rule has no 
application to sold-out junior lienholdersf citing Cash Valley 
Bankingy supra); Keever v. Nicholas Beers Co., 611 P.2d 1079, 
1083 (Nev. 1980)("It is well established that, while the 
statutory protections apply to sales under senior liens, neither 
the one action rule nor the fair market valuation limitations 
. . . apply to sold out junior lienholders, who are free to sue 
directly on their notes."); McMillan v. United Mortgage Co., 437 
P. 2d 878, 879 (Nev. 1968) ("We . . . hold that the 'One Form 
Action Rule1 does not apply to a sold-out junior lienholder where 
his security has been lost by foreclosure of a senior 
lienholder."); Schwerin v. Shostak, 28 Cal. Rptr. 332, 336 (Cal. 
Dist. Ct. App. 1963)("It has long been the law in California that 
the fOne Form of Action1 rule. . . does not apply to a sold out 
junior lienholder."); 59 C.J.S. Mortgages § 523 (1949)("Actions 
for a deficiency judgment must be brought within the period 
prescribed by statute . . . . [However,] such statute does not 
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apply to cases in which the lien of the mortgage has been cut off 
by the foreclosure of a prior mortgage, so that there cannot be a 
foreclosure and sale of the mortgage in issue.") 
(c) Moratory Laws Which Limit The Time to File an 
Action for a Deficiency. 
The statute relied upon by the appellants is a moratory law 
which strictly limits the period during which a foreclosing 
lienholder can file a deficiency action. Appellants correctly 
argue that courts have universally acknowledged that actions for 
a deficiency judgment must be brought within the time period 
prescribed by such statutes, even when that time period is very 
short. However, appellants have failed to disclose that the 
courts have consistently held that such statutes do not apply to 
actions brought upon an obligation which was once secured, but is 
no longer secured due to a foreclosure of a prior lien. 
For example, in Roseleaf Corp, v. Chierighino, 378 P. 2d 97 
(Cal. 1963), the plaintiff brought an action to recover the 
amounts unpaid on three notes which had been secured by second 
trust deeds. The second trust deeds were rendered valueless when 
the property was sold under powers of sale contained in the first 
trust deeds. The defendant asserted that the plaintiff's action 
was barred by California's three-month statute of limitation for 
deficiency judgments. Finding that the statute did not bar the 
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plaintiff's actionf the court simply stated that the three-month 
limitation period "does not apply to a sold-out junior 
lienholder" whose security has been rendered valueless by a 
senior sale. Id. at 99. (Citations Omitted.) 
Similarly, In Hillen v. Soulef supra, the defendant asserted 
that the plaintiff's action to recover funds due on a note after 
the security for the note was extinguished by foreclosure by a 
senior lienholder was barred by the three-month statute of 
limitation. In interpreting the statute, the court stated that 
since the power of sale under respondent's deed of trust was 
never exercised and the security had been exhausted by the sale 
under the first deed of trust, the plaintiff's action was "not an 
action for a deficiency judgment" and the three-month limitation 
period was not applicable. Id. at 349. 
Further, in Smith v. Mangin, 292 N.Y.S. 265 (N.Y. Mun. Ct. 
1936), the plaintiff, a junior lienholder whose security had been 
lost as a result of a foreclosure conducted by a senior 
lienholder, brought an action to collect on the remaining 
obligation. In defense, the defendant claimed that the 
plaintiff's action was barred by a New York statute which 
required that an action to collect a deficiency must be commenced 
within three months from the date of the foreclosure sale. In 
determining that the statute did not bar the plaintiff's action, 
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the court stated that the "short statute of limitations applies 
only to those cases where there has been a foreclosure of the 
mortgage which accompanies the [obligation]. The statute has no 
application where the lien of the mortgage has been cut off by 
the foreclosure of a prior mortgagee." Id. at 271. 
It is thus clear from the language in the Utah statute and 
from decisions interpreting similar statutes and moratory laws in 
general that Utah Code Ann. § 57-1-32 (1953) has no application 
to sold-out junior lienholders, such as respondents, who have had 
their security extinguished by a senior lienholder, who have not 
exercised their power of sale and who are bringing an action 
solely on a note. 
3. Practical Effect of Appellants1 Argument. 
The essence of appellants1 argument is contained in the 
following excerpt from their brief: 
"[I]f any creditor conducts any sale under 
Title 57, then the three-month rulef under 
Utah Code Ann. § 57-1-32 is automatically 
invoked against all creditors holding 
obligations secured by trust deeds on the 
property. Thus all creditors holding 
obligations secured by a trust deed are 
governed by Utah Code Title 57 once any 
creditor holding an obligation secured by a 
deed of trust elects the power of sale under 
said Title." 
Appellants1 Brief at 23. 
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As has been discussed above, appellants' argument is 
completely contrary to the law. Additionally, however, the 
acceptance of appellants1 tortured reading of Utah Code Ann. 
§ 57-1-32 (1953) would cause confusion and chaos in the 
finance and real estate industries. 
First, Utah Code Ann. §57-1-26(1) (1953) sets forth 
the procedure by which any person can file a Request for 
Notice to receive any relevant Notice of Default and/or 
Notice of Election to Sell. If a junior lienholder does not 
file a Request For Notice, no notice of a foreclosure sale 
need be given. See Utah Code Ann. §57-1-26(2) (1953). 
According to appellants1 analysis, a junior lienholder, who 
has not filed a Request For Notice and who has not therefore 
received notice of a foreclosure sale, will nonetheless be 
time barred from seeking a deficiency if he does not 
institute an action within three months following a 
foreclosure sale by a senior lienholder — a sale he did not 
even known about! Appellants have not and cannot present 
any authority that the legislature intended that Utah Code 
Ann. § 57-1-32 (1953) should operate in such an unfair 
manner to deprive junior lienholders of their rights. 
Second, a junior lienholder could receive notice of 
a senior lienholder's foreclosure sale at the time the 
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obligation to the junior lienholder is not in default or has 
not matured. According to the appellants1 analysis, that 
junior lienholder would be required to bring an action to 
collect on the note within three months of the foreclosure 
sale, whether or not the junior lienholder* s note was in 
default and whether or not the note had matured. An action 
brought on an obligation that is not in default and not yet 
due and payable would likely be dismissed summarily, unless 
the court concluded that Utah Code Ann. § 57-1-32 (1953) 
required the automatic acceleration of the due date of the 
junior obligation. The California Supreme Court discussed 
this possibility in Roseleaf Corporation v. Chierighino, 378 
P.2d 97 (Cal. 1963), where it stated, "to compel a junior 
lienholder to sue for a deficiency within three months of a 
seniorfs sale would unnecessarily compel acceleration of the 
junior obligation to the detriment of of the debtor." Id. 
at 99. Plainly, such a result would create an undue and 
unexpected hardship on debtors; therefore, the court 
concluded that the three-month period could have no 
application to sold-out junior lienholders. 
4. The Cases Cited by Appellants Have No Relation To 
This Matter. 
In support of their argument that respondents were 
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required to assert their claims within three months of the 
F.D.I.C.'s foreclosure salef appellants cite Green v. Coxf 
696 P.2d 1207 (Utah 1985) and Concepts, Inc. v. First 
Security Realty Services, 743 P.2d 1158 (Utah 1987). Both 
of these cases, however, are completely irrelevant. Cox 
involved a suit filed by first lienholders to obtain a 
deficiency judgment after they had exercised the power of 
sale provision contained in their deed of trust. There were 
no junior lienholders involved in the case. The courtfs 
opinion in Cox does not discuss, or even imply, that a 
junior lienholder must file an action to recover on a note 
within three months of the foreclosure of a senior 
lienholder's interest. 
Similarly, the Concepts, Inc. case has nothing to do 
with this case. In Concepts, Inc., the Supreme Court 
stated, "the sole legal issue before the trial court was the 
validity of the [foreclosure] sale.11 743 P.2d at 1159. 
Again, the Concepts, Inc. case involved a suit filed by a 
first lienholder to obtain a judgment for the difference 
between the proceeds it received as a result of foreclosing 
its deed of trust and the amounts remaining due on the 
obligation that the deed of trust secured. Again, there 
were no junior lienholders even mentioned in the case. 
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Thus, appellants have cited absolutely no authority to this 
court in support of their novel interpretation of Utah Code 
Ann, § 57-1-32 (1953). 
B. The District Court Properly Granted 
Respondents1 Motion For Summary Judgment In 
That There Were No Genuine Issues Of Material 
Fact And Respondents Were Entitled To Judgment 
As A Matter Of Law. 
1. Appellants Presented No Evidence 
Supporting Their Conclusory Allegation 
That They Were Accommodation Makers Of 
The Promissory Note. 
It is well established that a party claiming accommodation 
status has the burden of proving that status. See, e.g. , Utah 
Farm Production Credit Association v. Watts, 737 P.2d 154, 158 
(Utah 1987) ("A maker on a note proclaiming that he is an 
accommodation party . . . entitled to the privileges accorded 
[them] under the law has the burden of proving his accommodation 
character.11) This court has recently clarified that, whether a 
person is an accommodation party is a question of the intentions 
of the person claiming to be an accommodation party, the person 
who would be the accommodated party, and the person who was the 
holder of the paper when the alleged accommodation party 
signed. Id. Thus, in order to create a material issue of fact 
necessary to preclude the entry of summary judgment in this case, 
appellants had the burden of providing evidence to the district 
-30-
that appellants, respondents, and the Cundicks all intended to 
accord appellants the status of accommodation makers of the 
note. See, e.g.y Id. at 158. 
Other than their own self-serving and conclusory affidavits 
that they signed the note "as guarantors" (R. 118 at 11 4; R. 121 
at 11 4; R. 124 at 11 4)f appellants presented absolutely no facts 
to the district court supporting their contention that they were 
accommodation makers. First, the note itself does not identify 
the appellants as such (R. 49; Addendum "C"). Further, and 
contrary to appellants' argument, the location of appellants' 
signatures on the note, does not constitute evidence of their 
status as guarantors. Id. at 159 ("The fact that one party 
signs above another or to the left of another, without some 
serious indicia that the locus of the signature is to have any 
significance, is irrelevant [to question of accommodation 
status].") Finally, appellants presented no evidence that either 
the respondents or the Cundicks intended the appellants to enjoy 
accommodation status under the note. 
Indeed, the circumstances surrounding the execution of the 
note compel the conclusion that appellants were not accommodation 
makers. Significantly, and again contrary to appellants' 
argument, appellants received substantial benefits and value in 
connection with their execution of the note, unlike the typical 
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party claiming accommodation status. See Id, (reception of 
benefits by party in connection with execution of note raises 
"permissible inference" that party is not an accommodation 
maker). 
It must be recalled that at the time appellants agreed to 
execute the notef they were in default of their obligations owing 
to respondents under the Uniform Real Estate Contract (R. 140 at 
11 4). Respondents forbore from bringing suit against appellants 
under the Uniform Real Estate Contract and instead agreed to the 
terms of the Cundick sale, under which appellants and the 
Cundicks executed the subject promissory note. Respondents' 
forbearance alone constituted a substantial benefit to 
appellants, effectively extending the time for repayment of their 
debt. See, e.g.f Eastern Idaho Production Credit Ass'n. v. 
Placerton, Inc., 606 P.2d 967 (Idaho 1980); A&S Distributing Co. 
v. Wall - Tucher, Inc., 428 P.2d 254 (Okla. 1967). Further, 
appellants received a direct cash benefits in connection with the 
execution of the note because respondents1 agreed to apply the 
down payment of the Cundicks to the amount owing by appellants 
under the Uniform Real Estate Contract. Thus, appellants1 
receipt of substantial benefits in connection with their 
execution of the note creates an inference that they were 
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principal obligors and not accommodation makers. See, e.g., Utah 
Farm Production Credit Assn. v. Watts, supra at 159. 
More fundamental, it must be emphasized that the promissory 
note executed by appellants was merely a reaffirmation or renewal 
of their own debt to respondents owing under the Uniform Real 
Estate Contract. That debt was never extinguished and 
respondents certainly never agreed to release appellants from the 
debt. Rather, respondents simply agreed to extend the time of 
payment of the debt and to accept the Cundicks as co-obligors. 
Thus, the debt being their own, appellants, as a matter of law, 
cannot be accommodation makers of the note. jCd. , ("[A] party 
cannot be an accommodation maker on a note given for his or her 
own debt." citing Kopf v. Miller, 501 S.W. Sd. 532, 537 (Mo. App. 
1973)); see also Mooney v. G.R. & Associates, 746 P.2d 1174, 1177 
(Utah App. 1987) . 
In short, other than their own self-serving and conclusory 
allegations that they signed the note as "guarantors", appellants 
presented no evidence from which their accommodation party status 
could be inferred. To the contrary, appellants1 receipt of 
benefits in connection with the note and their pre-existing debt 
to respondents compel the conclusion that appellants were not 
accommodation makers of the note. 
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2. Even if Appellants Were Accommodation 
Makers of the Promissory Note, They 
Waived the Impairment of Collateral 
Defense* 
Appellants contend that as alleged accommodation makers of 
the notef they are entitled to the statutory protections afforded 
such parties under the Utah Uniform Commercial Code. 
Specificallyf appellants argue thatf based upon respondents1 
subordination of their trust deed, they should be allowed to 
invoke the impairment of collateral defense set forth at Utah 
Code Ann. §70A-3-606(1)(b) (1953), which states in pertinent 
part: 
(1) The holder discharges any party to the 
instrument to the extent that without such party's 
consent the holder 
(b) unjustifiably impairs any collateral for 
the instrument given by or en behalf of the party 
or any person against whom he has a right or 
recourse. 
(Emphasis added). 
Plainly, under the express terms of the statute, lack of 
consent to the impairment of collateral is a pre-condition to the 
assertion of the impairment of collateral defense. Indeed, the 
official comments to §3-606 of the Uniform Commercial Code 
expressly recognize that the defense is waived through consent 
given at any time by the accommodation maker: 
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2. Consent may be given in advance and is 
commonly incorporated in the instrument; or it may 
be given afterward. It requires no consideration 
and operates as a waiver of the consenting party's 
right to claim his own discharge 
U.C.C. §3-606 Comment 2 (1978). 
Appellantsf of course, neglect to point out that they 
consented to the subordination of respondents1 trust deed. The 
note executed by them expressly states that "[t]he makers, 
sureties, guarantors and endorsors hereof . . . consent to . . . 
the release of any security, or any part thereof, with or without 
substitution." (R. 49; Addendum ftClf). Thus, having expressly 
consented to the release of the security given in connection with 
the note, appellants plainly waived the impairment of collateral 
defense. See, e.g. , Continental Bank, etc. v Utah Sec. Mortg., 
701 P.2d 1095, 1097-98 (Utah 1985) (guarantors explicitly waived 
impairment of collateral defense by consenting to release of 
security); American Bank of Commerce v. Covolo, 540 P.2d 1294, 
1299 (N.M. 1975); Haney v. Deposit Guaranty National Bank, 362 
S.2d 1250, 1252 (Miss. 1978). 
3. Appellants Presented No Evidence to the 
District Court Supporting Their Arguments 
(1) That They Did Not Know About or 
Consent to Respondents1 Subordination of 
Their Trust Deed, (2) That the Amount 
Owing Under the Note was Disputed, or (3) 
That There Were Questions of Fact 
Concerning the Intent of the Parties and 
the Underlying Purpose of the Documents. 
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(a) Knowledge of or Consent to Subordination. Assuming 
appellants presented sufficient evidence to the district court 
from which their status as accommodation parties could be 
inferred, and assuming further that appellants did not waive the 
impairment of collateral defense by expressly consenting to the 
release of security, appellants nonetheless presented no evidence 
to the district court that they did not know about or did not 
consent to the subordination of respondents1 trust deed. 
Contrary to the suggestions in Appellants' Brief,6 appellants1 
affidavits are completely silent regarding whether or not they 
had knowledge of or consented to the subordination. (See R. 118-
126). There is thus not a shred of evidence in the record even 
suggesting that appellants were not fully aware of or did not 
fully consent to the subordination. Thus, for this additional 
reason, appellants' impairment of collateral defense must fail. 
(b) Amount Owing. In their Brief, appellants make the bold 
assertion that "the amount claimed by [respondents] that 
[appellants] owed under the trust deed note was specifically 
disputed." Appellants' Brief at 43. Appellants cite their own 
affidavits as support for this statement, but those affidavits in 
bAt page 43 of Appellants1 Brief, appellants state that 
respondents subordinated their lien on the collateral without the 
knowledge of the appellants, citing the affidavits of appellants 
for evidentiary support. 
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no way take issue with the amount claimed by respondents. (See 
R. 118-126). Indeed, there is absolutely no support in the 
record for appellants1 argument that the amount owing under the 
note was disputed and appellants simply misstate the record by 
suggesting otherwise. 
(c) Intent of the Parties and Purpose of the Documents. 
Appellants attempt to conjure up material issues of fact by 
suggesting vaguely that the "intent of the parties11 or the 
"purpose of the documents" was somehow unclear or in dispute. 
Merely saying such things, however, does not create a material 
issue of fact. Appellants do not even suggest the nature of 
these mysterious issues concerning "intent" or "purpose," or 
whether they have any bearing on appellants' liability to 
respondents. Indeed, appellants1 arguments in this regard 
appear to be nothing more than a smoke screen designed to divert 
this Court's attention from the clear and unambiguous language of 
the promissory note and appellants clear liability to 
respondents. 
'Similarly, respondents do not even discuss the relevance of 
other alleged "issues of fact" raised by them. For example, 
respondents suggest that there were "questions" concerning the 
value of the property sold at the trustee's sale, but leave one 
to guess what, if any, effect such "questions" have on their 
liability under the note to appellants. 
Q 
°Appellantsf citation to the case of W.M. Barnes Co. v. 
Sohio Natural Resources Co., 627 P.2d 56 (Utah 1981) provides no 
(Continued) 
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VII. 
CONCLUSION 
The district court properly denied appellants1 Motion to 
Dismiss respondents1 Complaint. Respondents1 Complaint is not an 
action for a deficiency judgment governed by Utah Code Ann. 
§ 57-1-32 (1953). Further, even if respondents1 action were 
properly characterized as an action for a deficiency, appellants 
have not cited a single case or authority suggesting that the 
three-month limitation period set forth in Utah Code Ann. 
§ 57-1-32 (1953) has any application to this case. In factr 
courts have consistently held that such statutes have no 
application to sold out junior lienholders such as respondents. 
Further, the district court properly granted respondents' 
Motion for Summary Judgment. The affidavits submitted by 
respondents were undisputed concerning appellants1 liability and 
the amount owing under the note. Appellants simply presented no 
evidentiary basis supportive of their argument that they signed 
the note as accommodation makers. Even if they were 
accommodation makers, they clearly and unambiguously consented to 
assistance in terms of illuminating the nature of appellants' 
argument. That case dealt with the issue of whether a deed was 
intended as a conveyance or a mortgage. This Court concluded 
that because the intentions of the parties on that issue were 
unclear, that summary judgment was inappropriate. Clearly, the 
Barnes case has no bearing whatsoever on this matter. 
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the release of security under the note and therefore waived the 
impairment of collateral defense. Finally, appellants shotgun 
remarks throughout their brief suggesting the existence of 
material issues of fact are simply unsupported by the record or 
are wholly irrelevant to appellants' liability to respondents. 
Thus, the district court's Order and Judgment should be affirmed 
and respondents should be awarded their attorneys1 fees 
associated with this appeal. 
DATED: September c \ , 1988. 
HANSEN & ANDERSON 
William P./SchWartz 
Shawn C. Ferrii 
50 West Broadw&y, 6th Floor 
Salt Lake Cityf Utah 84101 
Attorneys for Respondents 
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1988/ I caused to be mailed in the United States mail/ postage 
prepaid/ four true and correct copies of the foregoing 
Respondents1 Brief/ to: 
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4185 Harrison Boulevard/ #320 
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IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF WEBER COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
G. ADAMS LIMITED PARTNERSHIP, 
a Utah limited partnership, 
and C.A. FERRIN, JR., 
Pla itiffs, 
v. 
DAVID DURBANO, PAUL SACHTER, 
RICHARD MORTENSEN, STEVEN F. 
CUNDICK, and MARLENE H. 
CUNDICK, 
Defendants. 
ORDER 
Civil No, J053-87 
The Motion to Dismiss of defendants David Durbano, Paul Sachter and 
Richard Mortensen came on for hearing on December 14, 1987. The Court, having 
considered the memoranda submitted by the parties and the arguments of counsel, 
HEREBY ORDERS AS FOLLOWS: 
1. Defendants' Motion to Dismiss is denied; 
2. Defendants Durbano, Sachter and Mortensen shall have ten days 
from December 14, 1987 in which to respond to plaintiffs' Complaint and 
plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment; 
EXHIBIT A 
3. Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment will be determined by the 
Court pursuant to Rule 2,8 of the Local Rules of Practice for the Second Judicial 
District Court upon the conclusion of all briefing relating to the motion; 
4. Plaintiffs' Motion for Sanctions filed in response to defendants' 
Motion to Dismiss is denied. 
DATED: December ZD 
APPROVED AS TO FORM: 
DATED: December JgH987. 
HANSEN & ANDERSON 
ram e. bcnwartz 
50 West Broadway, 6t 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
DATEDs December , 1987. 
DURBANO k SMITH 
, 1987. 
BY THE COURT: 
)avid E. Roth 
District Court Judge 
Douglas M. Durbano 
4185 Harrison Boulevard, #320 
Ogden, Utah 84404 
Attorneys for Durbano, Sachter & Mortensen 
I Page . . .A#.VU. v- \ 
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IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF WEBER COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
G. ADAMS LIMITED PARTNERSHIP, 
a Utah limited partnership, 
and C.A. FERRIN, JR., 
Plaintiffs 
v. 
DAVID DURBANO, PAUL SACHTER, 
RICHARD MORTENSEN, STEVEN F. 
CUNDICK, and MARLENE H. 
CUNDICK, 
Defendants. 
Plaintiffs1, G. Adams Limited Partnership and C. A. Ferrin, Jr. ("Adams and 
Ferrin11) Motion for Summary Judgment came on regularly for hearing on 
January 29, 1988, at the hour of 11:00 a.m., before the Honorable Ronald O. Hyde 
in his courtroom at the Weber County Courthouse, Ogden, Utah. Adams and 
Ferrin were represented by William P. Schwartz, Esq. of Hansen & Anderson and 
Defendants David Durbano, Paul Sachter and Richard Mortensen were represented 
by Durbano, Smith <5e Reeve. Defendants Steven F. Cundick and Marlene Cundick 
did not contest Plaintiffs' Motion. Upon consideration of the Memoranda, 
Affidavits, Pleadings on File and the Arguments of Counsel, the Court finds that 
there is no genuine issue of material fact and that Adams and Ferrin are entitled 
to a judgment as a matter of law. 
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that judgment be and hereby is granted in 
favor of Plaintiffs and against all D Pendants, jointly and severally, as follows: 
ORDER GRANTING
 r 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT > f\ 
Civil No. (IQ53-87 
EXHIBIT B 
Recorded BookJ-/J.r. 
Page Lu.v .v . . 
Indexed 
A. For the principal sum of $38,604.59 together with prejudgment 
interest of $15,774.93 from May 4, 1984 through January 29, 1988, in the total 
amount of $54,379.52, plus interest thereon at the rate of eleven percent (11%) 
per annum ($16.42 per diem) from the date of entry of judgment until paid. 
B. For costs and reasonable attorneys1 fees incurred in obtaining the 
Judgment as established by affidavit in the amount of $ g>. /? Cf 3 , u , plus 
interest thereon at the rate of eleven percent (11%) per annum ($ 
per diem) from the date of entry of judgment until paid. 
C. For costs and reasonable attorneys1 fees incurred in collecting 
the Judgment. 
JUDGMENT RENDERED this / $ day of ^ dfttwiy, 1988. 
BY THE COURT 
ATTEST MY HAND AND SEAL OF SAID COURT this 
1988. 
/ Q day of January, 
CLERK OF THE COURT 
( 
By ' ^ \J*&&?i*. 
UeputyClerk /%t^r, 
•iled: <3 V"% - y " *g> 
!!s~ss-Mrtaa»aro.-« 
°S<*«n , Utah. 
$ 36,604.59 
FOR VALUE R E I V E D , the underfed. « y „ < £ 
Utah, or . ( .uch other place . , the holder hereof may de-nate 
TH.KTY E.CHT THOUSAND SIX HUNDRED FOUR AND 59/00 - ' 
DOLLARS ($38,604.59 
Ws«fher w>th mUreet from d.U . t the rate of Eleven ^ ^ , „ . 
, * „ ^ . * " " " > « D f o annum on 
«te imlMid prmc.pal, ...d prindpal ,„d intend payable „ foUow.; 
SEE PAYMENT SCHEDULE BELOW. 
DOLLARS ($ 
«* l** day of 
£ * Rlh!f *'*.?' ! T c h , u c c e * * « f month until the entire i » D a u * M i • \ a a d * • "— •»<*«>* on 
belence and eccnied intent immediately du? £*£££""* " V * « * » U* antire p r £ j 5 
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oft.me, renewal,, waive™ or . n o d f i c a t i o n Y u T t i " i ^ d ^ T ? ' , ^ " y • * •» « * * « 
e ^ J S " 8 " * . ? " ^ P ™ * 0 " o f «*• - ^ " 5 to t b ^ l ^ * * » , » « ~ f with raepect to 
of, with or without substitution. " * " • °» •»* •ecurity, or any part the*. 
Thia note U aecured by a Truat Deed of even date hewwith. 
<>"« (1) payment In the amount of $38 sni » . 
i« f«l l on or before J « u . " j / w S S ** t h * r " ^ I n t « « " to be p . l a 
y/t. .~. 
Vnun mm/ 
• U U I I V U l ' I 
- ^ ^ . ittstiCe 
. O ^ M . , 4 - , M u f c l N u l l . . , t t , t o . • • N . N f H . O u . H . t C 
W*" 
rvuioiT 
Uf)s 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF WEBER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
X^^J^M-^^i 
G ADAMS LIMITED PARTNERSHIP, 
a Utah limited partnership, 
and C. A. FERRIN, JR., 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
DAVID DURBANO, PAUL SACHTER, 
RICHARD MORTENSEN, STEVEN F. 
CUNDICK, and MARLENE CUNDICK, 
Defendants. 
RULING ON PLAINTIFFS' MOTION 
TO STRIKE AFFIDAVITS 
' ) 
Case No. 1053-87 
This matter was heard on a motion for summary judgment. 
Counsel for the defendants stated that he would be able to 
substantiate his defense if he was allowed some time to obtain 
the paper work from Commercial Security Bank. This additional 
time was granted over plaintiffs1 objection. When the additional 
time allocation had run out, defendants1 counsel contacted this 
judge by telephone stating he needed additional time because of 
the switchover from Commerical Security Bank to Key Bank, they 
were having difficulty locating the documents in question. This 
additional time was informally granted. Later, rather than 
supply the Court with the purported documentation, defendants 
submit an affidavit, which sets up a new argument based on 
opinion and conclusions in regard to the transaction. The 
documentation that defendants1 counsel stated he would submit to 
the Court has never been submitted; and no authority was granted 
for the submission of additional affidavits and/or argument. 
EXHIBIT D 341 
Ruling on Plaintiff's Motion 
to Strike Affidavits 
Case No. 1053-87 
Plaintiffs' motion to strike the affidavit is granted, 
The summary judgment previously granted stands* 
DATED this & day of May, 1988. 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on this [Q day of May, 1988, a 
true and correct copy of the foregoing Memorandum Decision was 
served upon the following: 
William P. Schwartz 
Shawn C. Ferrin 
HANSEN & ANDERSON 
50 West Broadway, Sixth Floor 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Douglas M. Durbano 
John H. Geilraann 
DURBANO, SMITH & REEVE 
Attorney for Defendants 
4185 Harrison Boulevard 
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Secretary 
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